THE POLITICS OF PASSAGE
One of a Series of Articles on
THE NATIVE LAND CLAIMS
Alaska Legislative Aide
to the Late Congressman, Nick Begich
COMPILED & PRODUCED
ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CENTER FOR NORTHERN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA - FAIRBANKS
Dr. Marshall L. Lind
Commissioner of Education
Director, Center for Northern Educational Research
ARTWORK: CANDACE OWERS
TO THE READER
This booklet is one of a collection of articles written by people
who are interested in Native land claims. As you will see, all of the
people do not agree. They present their ideas for you to read and
discuss. You may be excited about some of their ideas because you
think they are absolutely right, or very wrong. When you have
finished reading the articles, you will probably have done a lot of
thinking about Native land claims and Alaskan politics.
Politics is not an easy field to understand. And yet politics is
what the Native land claims are all about. Most of the articles were
written by people who have spent a lot of time working in the world
of politics. These people have a whole vocabulary which most students
have not yet learned. So, to help students understand the reading,
there is at the beginning of each article a list of definitions of
terms. Any words in italics are explained for you at the
beginning of that article, or an earlier one.
At the end of some articles are questions which you can ask
yourself. In the margin, next to the question are numbers. If you go
back to paragraphs in the article with the same numbers, and reread,
you can increase your understanding. We cannot say you will always
have definite answers but you may form your point of view.
ARTICLES AND AUTHORS
THE POLITICS OF PASSAGE
The Alaska Native Land Claims Settlement is felt by many to be the
most important Indian legislation ever to be enacted in the United
States. If this is true, and it may very well be, it is because the
Alaska Natives actually "won" their cause in an arena where the
Indians rarely win one, and where very few people gave them any
chance at all. How that happened is the subject of this chapter,
although several books are required to really tell the story.
There are many versions of how it all happened. Any major act of
Congress involves so many forces that each person sees only a part,
and feels his part to be especially important. Still, there were
certain factors that made it all happen in the 92nd Congress which
everyone could understand.
When the 92nd Congress began meeting in January of 1971, there was
nothing really new about the Alaska Native Land Claims. They had been
before Congress for years, and during the 91st Congress, a settlement
bill had even been passed in the Senate, but no action had been taken
by the House. Still, there were important reasons why the 92nd
Congress would be different. A short look backward is the best way to
understand those differences.
During the 91st Congress, the U.S. Senate led the way on the
Settlement Act. There were two major reasons for this Senate
leadership. First, leadership did not come from any of the other
possible sources, such as the Administration, the State of Alaska,
the House of Representatives or the Alaska Natives themselves.
Second, the Senate had a good background of facts to work with, due
to the efforts of a few Senators who were interested in the cause of
Alaskan Natives and in the cause of Indian justice nationwide.
These Senators included men like Edward Kennedy, who had a long
background of interest in Indian affairs. Along with his Special
Subcommittee on Indian Education, he had made valuable studies on the
economic, health and educational conditions of American Indians. This
work greatly influenced the way in which both the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations thought of Indians affairs. Even more important was
Senator Henry Jackson, the Chairman of the Senate Interior Committee,
which prepared the bill that passed the Senate. In 1968, Senator
Jackson took the unusual step of asking the Federal Field Committee
for Development Planning in Alaska to help gather the facts necessary
to write a settlement. That report, Alaska Natives and the
Land, was sent to Jackson as the 91st Congress got underway in
1969 and became the framework for the Senate bill. It remains one of
the best statements on the relationship of the Alaska Natives to
At the same time that a reasonably well-informed Senate moved
toward action, the House of Representatives argued over a number of
widely differing bills. The State of Alaska, under Governor Keith
Miller definitely stated that the land claims were a Federal matter
and generally refused to participate in the settlement, either
financially or by supplying guidance and support. The Nixon
Administration showed a similar lack of interest in a settlement. A
possible explanation for the lack of interest by both the State and
the Administration was that neither yet realized the importance of a
claims settlement for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. As a final factor in
the lack of leadership during the 91st Congress, the Alaska Natives
were neither well organized nor united enough to play the effective
role they would play only one year later.
During the elections of the fall of 1970, many of the forces
surrounding the Native land claims issue began to change, and it
became clear that the 92nd Congress would face new issues and new
people as it considered the claims. William A. Egan was again elected
Governor of Alaska after being out of office for four years during
the Walter Hickel/Keith Miller term. Governor Egan and Nick Begich,
who won the only Alaska seat in the U.S. House, both campaigned on
the firm promise to see the land claims settled. Each promised both
willingness to listen and state participation in the settlement,
things which were lacking in the years before.
Changes were also happening in the organizations of Alaska Natives
Regional groups were becoming better organized, and the Alaska
Federation of Natives gained strength as the spokesman for all
Alaskan Natives in the land claims struggle. The election of Don
Wright as the AFN President changed the organization, brought new
people in as leaders, and probably made the AFN both more militant
and more capable of dealing in the practical world of politics.
Perhaps most important was that the experience of the unsuccessful
years served as a lesson for future planning. The Native group that
finally began planning for the attack on the 92nd Congress was
experienced . It was also a better organized, better advised, and
more united group than ever before.
Still, this would not have been enough to explain all that was
completed during the year. The force of other events also shaped the
final result: The 92nd Congress was one which came just before a
Presidential election year, thus making it a time when people up for
re-election try to show that they will keep old promises. In the case
of President Nixon, he had made a strong speech in July of 1970,
promising the end of national injustive to Indians and stating that
he believed in 'Indian self-determination." The Indian rights
movement was also gaining strength and public acceptance. In the
Spring of 1971, at the Convention of the National Congress of
American Indians, Vice President Agnew stated again the President's
earlier promises and especially mentioned the Alaska Native claims.
Also influencing the Nixon Administration, as well as the State of
Alaska, was the fast growing recognition that until the Alaska Native
Claims were settled, the permit for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline could
not be issued, and the "land freeze" which bound nearly 90% of
Alaska's vast lands would not be lifted. The "freeze" began in 1966
by order of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to protect both
Alaska land and the rights of the Alaskan Natives. It stopped Alaska
from gaining title to lands selected under the Statehood Act,
prevented many Alaskans from gaining private land they wanted, and
stood in the way of the pipeline. Most non-Native Alaskans had
learned to hate the freeze and, in an effort to see it ended,
supported an immediate settlement to the claims. To many people, the
important issue was that the settlement be quick rather than that it
meet the needs of Natives or be fair.
Both the State of Alaska and the oil industry were beginning to
feel the economic problems of holding back development of North Slope
oil. An increasing number of people began to realize that the
settlement of the Alaska Native Land Claims was an important step in
the development of Alaska. As the 92nd Congress opened in January,
1971, a great variety of people and groups, for a wide variety of
good and bad reasons, had made the settlement of the land claims
their first goal.
The Natives pushed the matter from the beginning. An extremely
able legal and consulting team headed by Ramsey Clark, put together a
proposed bill which set out the united Native position on settlement
terms. The Natives realized the changing and favorable situation in
Congress. Sixty million acres became the basic land demand, even
though a vote on forty million had received only thirteen votes in
the Senate the previous year. Similar changes were made in other
parts of the Native demands, and this bill became the basic reference
point for the Native position during the months that followed. All
members of the Alaska delegation became sponsors of the bill, and the
Natives also secured the sponsorship of most of the Indian rights
supporters in both the House and Senate, including nearly every
member who had been mentioned as a possible Presidential candidate.
During this same early period, important Native leaders and
advisors began a campaign to persuade the White House to submit a
bill favorable to the Native position. It was already clear that the
basic bill of the Senate Interior Committee would be the ten million
acre bill of the last Congress, and that Chairman Wayne Aspinall of
the House Interior Committee would introduce his own legislation
which would not even be as generous as the Senate bill. Somehow, it
seemed very necessary to gain firm support from the Nixon
Administration to tip the balance toward the Native position. Most
Native leaders and advisors felt that such support would not come
from the Department of Interior, and its Bureau of Indian Affairs, so
Interior was largely bypassed in favor of direct contact with the
White House. Later, when White House support of the Native claims was
felt by the Interior Department, their Committee gave much more
At the same time that this was happening, the Natives were also
organizing a united lobbying effort which showed the benefits of the
experience gained in previous years. One of the keys to success is to
gain early promises of support, and the Natives were getting them
rapidly from national Indian organizations, oil and other business
interests, civil rights groups, and the all-important press. Later in
the process, the influence and friendship of these many different
supporters would be very necessary to the passage of the legislation.
Finally, three bills would be introduced in the Senate and three
in the House. Shortly after the 91st Congress opened, the first two
were introduced in each chamber. The Natives' bill was one of them,
calling for sixty million acres of land with full title, more than
one billion dollars in a money settlement, and a system for managing
the settlement mainly by Native regional corporations. In the Senate,
Senator Jackson introduced about the same bill which had passed the
year before, calling for ten million acres of land in full title plus
Native subsistence living protection, money totalling up to one
billion dollars, and an organization plan of statewide corporations,
rather than regional groups.
In the House, where the Native bill was also introduced with a
number of important sponsors, the second bill was one prepared by
House Interior Committee Chairman Wayne Aspinall. This bill provided
for as little as one million acres of land in full title with other
land given subsistence protection. The organizational structure
centered around village corporations, and the money provisions
included up to one billion dollars, but with a pay-off schedule which
made this figure somewhat less valuable.
After the introduction of these bills, the situation was basically
the same in both the House and Senate. In each chamber the Native
bill was at one extreme, and at the other extreme was a much more
conservative bill prepared by the chairman of the Interior Committee
in each chamber. Under ordinary circumstances, the result of this
situation would have been that the bills of the powerful committee
chairman would win, but this was no ordinary year, and no ordinary
cause. The committee chairman would have to -give in.
The first new factor was the Administration bill, which was
introduced in both the House and Senate in early April of 1971. The
Native effort at the White House showed clearly, as the bill provided
for forty million acres of land with full title, up to one billion
dollars in cash, and an organizational pattern which was centralized.
It was a bill which definitely favored the Native position. Although
the short summaries of the bills included here cannot possibly
explain the many details of each bill, it was clear that the
Administration bill was a breaking point; the work at the White House
had paid off.
How the Administration bill was won is a story in itself. The
Natives had a good cause. It was an election year. The Indian rights
movement was gaining strength and acceptance. Still, none of these
factors could have been a controlling influence at the White House,
or even made it possible for Native leaders to see the White House
staff without other assistance. This assistance came largely from the
oil industry and related business interests, and from the only
Republican in Alaska's delegation, Senator Ted Stevens. This was the
first of many times that the shared fates of the land claims and the
Trans-Alaska pipeline would produce a strange coalition of support
for the Native cause.
Perhaps the most important result of the Administration bill was
that it made believable the pro-Native position and encouraged many
members of Congress to stop thinking of the settlement as merely a
"give-away" to silence the nagging claims at the lowest possible
price. The Administration bill was also a message to the Republicans
in both the House and Senate of the position they might comfortably
take on the issue. This White House guidance certainly helped to
produce excellent Republican leadership on the bill, especially on
the House Interior Committee where it was essential to influence the
most conservative bill of Chairman Aspinall.
To this point, the progress of the land claims had been about the
same in the House and the Senate, and it continued this way for one
more step, as hearings were held in each Interior Committee. The
factors coming out of these hearings were hopeful. First, the State
of Alaska, under Governor Egan, showed that it was prepared to
fulfill its promise of participation. With few exceptions, the State
agreed to go along with all reasonable terms of settlement and to
contribute up to one-half billion dollars to be taken from the
mineral revenues of the State after the North Slope began to produce
oil. It became clear that major concerns of the State were to see the
settlement accomplished quickly, to insure that it would allow land
selection under the Statehood Act to begin again, and to allow North
Slope development to start.
Also during the hearings, the Alaska delegation continued to show
a belief in a cooperative approach, putting aside personal glory in
favor of working to improve and speed up action on the claims. Also,
the hearings produced the first signs of a growing environmental
interest in the legislation, an interest which would become one of
the major controversies later. From both the State and Native
viewpoints, the hearings were a success, although some Native
disunity came to the surface in the testimony of North Slope Natives
who asked for a greater portion of the settlement split based on the
large and valuable area of land they were giving up in any
settlement. This was only a sign of the difficulty faced by the
Alaska Federation of Natives in holding the regional groups together.
With the hearings over, and the Administration bill introduced,
all necessary first steps to action had been taken. It had been long
understood that any action would have to begin in the House, as it
had failed to act the previous year when the Senate passed its bill.
This also provided a built in strategy for the Natives. Whatever
legislation the more conservative House finally passed could then be
appealed to the Senate where the natural competition between the two
chambers could be exploited, resulting in a more favorable bill from
the Senate. Later, the differences could be resolved in a conference
committee of the House and Senate.
House Interior Committee Chairman Wayne Aspinall made it clear
very early that he would use the chairman's traditional powers of
controlling the rules and working slowly to see that his own bill was
the one which would be the basis of the settlement. In any other
year, his power on such matters would have been impossible to fight,
but this was a different year. Along with Alaska Congressman Nick
Begich, who was always after the Chairman and the committee to act on
this legislation, the Natives had many friends on the committee. Even
those who were not usually in favor of Indian causes were subject to
at least one of the many interests involved in his particular cause,
whether it was the Administration, the oil industry, the State of
Alaska or some other. The result was that the power of the
conservative forces on the committee was still great, but not as
great as usual on this issue. The message from all interests was to
It was the continued threat of Committee Chairman Aspinall and
Indian Affairs Subcommittee Chairman James Haley not to act
quickly, and perhaps not to act at all, that was the most obvious in
the struggle in the House. For the Natives and the State, who would
be the ones who would have to live most closely with the settlement,
this was particularly difficult. It was a delicate balance, held by
all in favor of the bill but particularly by the Natives and the
State of Alaska, to make the legislation as good as possible, but to
carefully avoid such strong disagreement with the committee
leadership that delay would occur.
When people disagreed, and delay threatened, the great number of
interests involved would work with those whom they knew best. The
Administration would ask that Republicans cooperate on the committee,
oil industry representatives would get in touch with members who were
usually friendly to their interests, and so on. All the factors
listed earlier which made the 92nd Congress so different from the
91st came into play, and the support for the legislation came from
many sources for a wide variety of reasons.
There were crises along the way, and it appeared more than once
that the Indian Affairs Subcommittee would fail to act at all. But
each time compromises were made which kept the bill alive. Often, the
central figure in the compromise was Alaska Congressman Nick Begich,
who had always refused to take sides and generally stayed in the
middle to help compromises. Suprisingly, the bill began to change
during this process, and the one million acres of the Aspinall bill
grew toward twenty. Although it was clear that any final House bill
would look very much like the Aspinall bill, many important changes
Finally, there came a point when it became clear that most of the
possible changes had been made and the shortness of time demanded
that final subcommittee action be taken as soon as possible. A final
try for forty million acres was made, and a final compromise agreed
upon which actually provided for this much land on a "deferred
selection" basis. This was not really acceptable to the Natives, but
very important in order to argue that the House of Representatives
had "accepted" the idea of forty million acres.
The committee work of the House is bacically a closed affair. Most
of the events just described occurred in near secrecy, so that when
the Indian Affairs Subcommittee finally acted to report out a land
claims bill, it was a surprise even to many of those who were
interested in the bill. It was also a clear signal that an Alaska
Native Land Claims bill would pass in the 92nd Congress. The Senate
picked up the signal immediately, and action began there.
Between the action of the Indian Affairs Subcommittee and
consideration by the full Interior Committee, which is the next step
in the process, forces began to unify around the compromise bill.
From this point on, Chairman Aspinall would be the defender of the.
bill and the leader of its advocates. Although the Natives, the State
of Alaska, several Native organizations, and others disagreed with
parts of the compromise bill, there was an informal unity to unsure
its passage in the House. It is interesting to note that Chairman
Aspinall, in return for his continued support, tried to make the
agreement both formal and binding on the Natives, even with respect
to their future actions in the Senate, but this was wisely
sidestepped by the Native leadership.
This basic unity carried the bill through approval by the full
committee and on to the floor of the House. This unity became
important in the full committee when numerous environmental
amendments were offered which would have affected the land selection
process in the bill, and possibly the pipeline. Although some of
these amendments, especially those regarding land-use planning in
Alaska, could have been good additions to the bill, the coalition was
by this time so solid that all major changes were rejected. These
environmental amendments would later become the big controversy in
the bill on the floor of the House.
In the Senate, the action of the House Indian Affairs Subcommittee
was seen as a sure sign that the House would actually pass a bill
during the 92nd Congress. That the House had acted at all was seen by
most as a victory, that the House bill was quite acceptable to most
interests was regarded as a happy surprise. Since there was little
doubt that the Senate would act, the goal of everyone, especially the
Natives, was that the Senate pass a bill which corrected all the
weaknesses and omissions of the House bill. The Natives especially
tried to make the Senate bill far more generous than that of the
House. Later, when the two bills were compromised in a conference
committee, the goal would be to keep the best features of each one in
the final settlement.
Because the Senate Interior Committee was more open and more
willing to listen than that of the House, and because the entire
Senate has simpler rules due to its smaller size, the chances to
accomplish these goals were good. The focus was on Senator Jackson's
ten million acre bill of the previous year, which after the House
action, became the most conservative bill around. With the pressure
of a more generous House bill, a far more generous Administration
bill, a strong Native lobbying effort, the Alaska pipeline and its
importance to his State of Washington, and his announcement as a
Presidential candidate all weighing on Senator Jackson, there seemed
little doubt that his bill would be open to real change.
In addition to all the pressure factors listed, there was also the
fact that Henry Jackson is an able Senator, with a good and open
Interior Committee staff. Unlike the House, where progress on the
bill was marked by a series of delays and minor arguments, the Senate
Interior Committee took up the issues in workmanlike fashion, with
much of the work open to the representatives of the Natives, the
State of Alaska, and all the other concerned interests. Although
there were disagreements, they were resolved in a way which did not
threaten the legislation itself. For instance, the land planning and
environmental issues which had caused such arguments in the House
Interior Committee were handled by including an clause prepared by
Alaska Senator Mike Gravel establishing a joint state-federal
land-use planning commission.
Through such a process, the Senate Interior Committee brought its
settlement legislation to a point of readiness, waiting only on final
House action. The goal was to insure that the Senate bill was more
liberal than whatever the House finally passed, but how much more
liberal was still at issue.
It was at this point, only days before the House Interior
Committee acted that the realization hit many people and groups in
Alaska that a bill would be passed. A wave of immediacy was felt, and
many in Alaska suddenly cared what was in the bill. A wide range of
interests, including Chambers of Commerce, mining interests, Native
regional and village corporations, and others changed their concern
from "passage at any price" to "who is getting what?" Some Alaskans
criticised the Alaska delegation in Congress, the Egan
Administration, and the AFN leadership. When they discovered that,
while some had been doing nothing, others had been working hard to
prepare bills which were more far reaching than anyone had ever
expected. Even the AFN leadership was criticised by some of its
regions and villages which were discovering that such broad
legislation can never fully answer all the specific problems of each
Although the controversy grew hot in the final days, the work of
many months was impossible to undo, and the fact was that the process
leading to the bills in each chamber was both long and relatively
open. The unity reached in the House by earlier compromises was most
important now, as Chairman Aspinall stood by the bill he had finally
agreed to, even though it was many times more generous than he had
originally planned. The Interior Committee of the House reported out
its bill, and was followed days later by the Senate Interior
The next step was action by the full House and Senate. Again the
Senate would play the waiting game, acting only after the House had
passed its bill. One final factor was to come into the House passage,
however, and it was enough to finally prove the strength and wisdom
of the early compromises which unified the support for the bill. The
factor was the growing number of people in favor of an environmental
amendment to the bill which would set down a wide range of land
planning requirements in the House bill and greatly affect the land
selection rights of the State of Alaska under the Statehood Act.
Although this entire issue is the subject of another chapter, the
point is that it became one of the most hard-fought environmental
issues of the year in a year when environmental issues (like the SST
defeat) were doing well.
When the House bill came to the floor of the House for debate, the
issue was not the land claims bill itself, but the land-use planning
amendment sponsored by Congressman Udall of Arizona. To defeat that
amendment, and insure the passage of the final bill, one of the
strangest coalitions in recent memory got together, including the
Alaska Natives, the Nixon Administration, organized labor, the oil
industry, civil rights and Indian organizations, and the House
leadership. The difficult choice was between Native rights and
environment, or so it was portrayed, and the Udall amendment was
narrowly defeated after one of the most exciting debates of the year.
After that the bill was passed 334 to 63.
In contrast to the wild atmosphere and unpredictable outcome of
the House proceedings, the Senate took up its bill in quiet and
orderly fashion only ten days later, passing it without serious
debate or amendments, and on a voice vote rather than a roll call.
The only consideration for the senate was that it act quickly to keep
the legislation moving and to avoid the heat of the growing
controversy in Alaska.
Looking quickly at the bills passed by the House and Senate, there
was little question that the Senate bill was the one most favorable
to the Native position. It contained the right to immediately select
forty million acres of land, limited only by its location near
existing Native villages. The House bill gave the right to only about
eighteen million acres on an immediate basis, with twenty-two million
more to come after the State of Alaska had selected its land under
the Statehood Act.
Both bills were similar in the cash settlement provided, with the
House bill providing up to $925 million and the Senate up to $1
billion. The greatest difference between the two was in the
distribution of the money and the administrative requirements for
Native organizations. The Senate bill relied mainly on statewide
Native corporations having broad powers, while the House bill
generally favored the village as the basic level of organization,
even going so far as to require a certain amount of cash to be
distributed directly to the village level. Also, the two bills
contrasted sharply in level of detail, with the House bill being
extremely short and straightforward, while the Senate bill was
extremely detailed in trying to cover all possible situations that
might arise in the settlement.
Again, it is necessary to say that the bills were far more complex
than this short summary can explain, and the task of compromising
them would be difficult. To do so, a conference committee to resolve
the differences was appointed with members from the House and Senate.
The entire Alaska delegation was included, and in the case of
Congressman Begich, this was an important victory because first term
Congressmen are rarely appointed by the House.
Although there is not space here to fully set out the entire
interesting story of the conference committee meetings, some things
are worth nothing. The first is that it was at this point that the
Native strategy to keep the most favorable features of each bill was
to have taken effect. Although some changes were won, such as the
ability to select forty million acres of land immediately. many other
issues were not decided so favorable. These issues included the
organization plan, on which the House bill favoring the village level
prevailed. Also, many of the detailed Senate clauses directed to
possible future problems were cut from the final bill in favor of
simpler House provisions.
It certainly cannot be said that the Native strategy failed at
this point because of these things, but it was clear that the closed
nature of the conference committee, combined with other factors,
certainly limited the ability of the Natives to influence the
committee as much as desired. Two of the other factors are
particularly important. The first is that this conference pitted two
of the toughest committee chairmen - Wayne Aspinall and Henry Jackson
against one another. The fact that Jackson, who was also running a
Presidential campaign, was absent from many of the meetings, was
decisive, as the Senate conferees were without a strong leader. At
the same time, Chairman Aspinall made it clear very early in the
proceedings that he and the House had come as far as they were
prepared to come on certain issues, and it seems the conferees
largely believed him, as it was clear that the House bill largely won
in the final settlement.
The second factor was that the State of Alaska, and Governor Egan,
seemed to have special influence during the conference deliberations.
Although the Governor did not participate in the meetings, he was
active in a consulting role. The conferees, especially Wayne Aspinall
and the Alaska delegation, seemed to feel that it was the entire
State of Alaska, rather than the Natives alone, that would feel the
greatest impact of the settlement. The official position of the State
became influential. At one point, when it became clear that the State
would not adopt the entire "Native position" on the final bill, AFN
President Don Wright broadly threatened a "new Indian war" in Alaska.
Still, the State and the conference committee held firm, and the
final bill was a compromise most guided by the House bill. The "one
day war" was forgotten, the statement was explained away, and the
realization grew that the final bill was a great victory for the
Alaska Natives, and an historic day for the State of Alaska.
The fact is that the Natives succeeded in winning their cause
against heavy odds, and with the assistance of an unlikely set of
supporters. Along the way, they had to overcome their own amateurish
lobbying efforts, an angry reaction from some Alaskans, arguments
among themselves, poor communications, and a conservative Congress
which had a questionable record in responding to Indian rights. What
it all means remains to be answered, but it is certain that the
passage of this bill represents a milestone in American Indian
affairs, and an event which for Alaska rivals Statehood in economic,
social and political importance.
Alaska Legislative Aide
to the Late Congressman, Nick Begich
T E R MS
the 1971 session of the government in Washington D. C.
There are two parts of Congress: an upper division, the
Senate, and a lower division, the House of Representatives.
a suggested law. A bill is introduced in the House by a
representative, then discussed and finally voted on. The
same thing happens in the Senate.
the President and his advisors.
SENATE INTERIOR COMMITTEE
a group of senators who are in charge of studying matters
related to American resources. The Committee makes
recommendations and writes bills for the Senate.
the part someone plays with other people. A man may play
the role of father at home with his children and the role of
tough politician in Washington, D. C.
has to do with power. It is making decisions for and
generally taking care of yourself.
the right of ownership.
a group of experts asked to give advice on some problem.
(of a bill)
the people who speak in favor of a bill or a group.
HOUSE INTERIOR COMMITTEE
a group of representatives who are in charge of studying
matters related to American Indians and Eskimos, and natural
resources. The Committee makes recommendations and writes
bills for the House of Representatives.
a law or laws.
talking to legislators to persuade them to vote a certain
either the Senate or the House of Representatives.
an organization that is treated like a person under the
law. It can own land, buy, sell, spend, and borrow money;
sue and be sued.
the way in which something is set up. The Settlement Act
tells how villages must organize to get their money.
sticking to routine as much as possible, continuing what
has been done in the past.
a group made up of people who want the same thing to
happen but for differing reasons.
an agreement where at first people disagreed but all gave
in a little.
choosing of areas of land at some time in the future.
additions to a bill dealing with controls on man's use of
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
an organization of businessmen in a town or city. It
tries to find wavs to increase business in the town.